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Measuring the effectiveness of selectivity:  An analysis of the MCC 
foreign aid model 
I. Introduction 
Controversies related to the effectiveness of foreign aid have persisted for decades.  One of the 
most controversial aspects of foreign aid is the practice of donor agencies imposing policy 
conditions on recipient countries.  Aid conditionality – which is employed by all donor agencies, 
but is most often attributed to the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank – uses 
foreign aid as an ex-ante incentive to influence recipient governments’ macroeconomic policies.  
Many analysts argue that these policies have not led to economic growth, either because the 
countries did not implement the reforms as promised or because the donors imposed policies 
that were inappropriate for the countries’ economic development.  Following this argument, 
aid reformers have advocated for more country-ownership in the process, allowing 
governments to decide which policies they believe will be most effective in leading to their 
country-specific economic growth.  Others have promoted the concept of ‘selectivity,’ whereby 
aid allocations are based on a country’s past commitments to a set of predetermined policies – 
the argument being that aid will be more effective in countries that have already adopted pro-
growth policies.  Finally, aid reformers contend that foreign aid is ineffective, in part, due to the 
allocation process which has predominately been non-transparent, subjective, and tied to 
national foreign policy interests.   
As a result of the mounting criticism of the foreign assistance regime, the Millennium Challenge 
Account (MCA) was created in 2002, and represents a major paradigm shift in the way the 
United States implements its foreign aid policy.  The organization established to manage MCA, 
the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), has adopted a new model for aid allocation.  
MCC allocates aid through a selection process that measures countries’ past performance on a 
set of publicly accessible governance indicators that countries are able to choose from to 
exhibit their commitments to economic growth.  In this way, the MCC model incorporates a 
variety of the concepts from aid reformists in its method for allocating aid, including selectivity, 
transparency, and county-ownership.  In addition, MCC evaluates the past performance of 
countries relative to one another, creating a competitive arena for foreign aid allocations, and 
suggests that this model has the dividend of creating incentives for other countries to pursue 
pro-growth policies (MCC, 2011).  This incentive-based outcome, whereby countries are 
influenced to make policy reforms in hopes of being rewarded for their efforts, has been 
termed the ‘MCC effect’ (MCC, 2011). 
There have been two known studies conducted to test the MCC effect, and both studies found 
that the MCC model is effective in motivating countries to improve their performance on the 
governance indicators in order to become eligible for funding (Johnson, 2006; Ohler, 2010).  
However, the research found that countries are more likely to focus on investments in social 
services, such as girls’ primary education and public health, than policies related to democratic 
governance such as rule of law, government accountability, and fighting corruption (Johnson, 
2006).   The research makes the assumption that countries are more inclined to focus on the 
social services because they are easier to affect in a shorter period of time than the other 
indicators related to democratic governance and creating a friendly business environment 
(Johnson, 2006).    
The most recent study, which focused on a single governance indicator, Control of Corruption, 
found that only those countries close to meeting the eligibility threshold for this indicator were 
induced to improve their performance (Ohler, 2010).  The research postulates that countries 
weigh the costs associated with becoming eligible against the chances of being adequately 
rewarded for their efforts within a reasonable timeframe, and therefore countries starting out 
significantly below the thresholds choose not to compete for the funding (Ohler, 2010).   
Finally, Ohler (2010) found that once countries attain eligibility status, their efforts to improve 
performance on the Control of Corruption indicator diminish.  This raises a similar concern to 
research evaluating traditional models that use ex-post conditionality to induce policy change, 
whereby countries agree to adopt certain policies, but fail to do so once they receive the aid 
and the incentive to reform disappears (Tendler, 1975; Svensson, 2003; Easterly, 2006).  In this 
sense, the ex-ante conditionality model may initially be more effective at inducing policy 
reforms than the traditional ex-post model; however, once countries pass the “hurdles” 
necessary to acquire foreign aid, i.e. eligibility and recipient status, they may cease or reverse 
their policy reform efforts.    
The literature has shown that one of the key challenges of evaluating development programs is 
disaggregating the complex role that incentives play.  Departing from the previous studies 
related to the MCC model, which focused exclusively on the so-called MCC effect on countries 
before they became eligible for aid, this study aims to provide insight into the effectiveness of 
selectivity in influencing long-term policy reforms by looking at how countries are responding to 
the program after attaining eligibility or recipient status.  It is worth noting that this study does 
not attempt to evaluate the appropriateness of the policy reforms being promoted by MCC, but 
only the model’s effectiveness at inducing long-term adoption of these policies by eligible and 
recipient countries.  I use a difference-in-difference time series regression model to examine 
the question of whether reaching the eligibility threshold or being awarded funding has an 
effect on how countries perform on the eligibility criteria.  Specifically, I aim to answer the 
questions:  Does country performance on policy reforms decrease after countries attain 
eligibility status or receive aid?  And, is there a difference between how low-income countries 
(LICs) and lower-middle-income countries (LMICs) respond to the program overtime?  
Answering these questions is vital to gaining a better understanding of the incentive structure 
at play within an aid allocation model based on competitive selectivity.     
I find evidence that eligible and recipient countries continue to make minimal gains after 
becoming eligible in a number of the governance indicators; however these efforts appear to 
significantly diminish once countries receive aid.  The general trend in indicator performance 
suggests that LMIC recipients continue to invest in the democratic governance indicators (e.g. 
Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness), whereas LICs shift from focusing on the 
social services indicators (e.g. Health Expenditures), to some of the economic governance 
indicators (e.g. Days to Start a Business) once they receive funding.  In addition, my findings 
show that the indicators of Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, Voice 
and Accountability, and Regulatory Policy are all highly correlated.  This is consistent with 
previous research that shows these indicators are only measuring two dimensions of 
democratic governance (Knoll, 2006).  I conclude with a number of policy recommendations to 
address the declining performance of countries under this model.  I suggest shrinking the size of 
the candidate pool to only LICs, and making allocation decisions either on a regional basis or 
measuring individual country improvements over a period of time in absolute terms.  This 
would increase the proportion of competing countries, forcing continued improvement on the 
indicators among eligible and recipient countries, in addition to creating a more equitable aid 
allocation process.  Finally, I suggest the democratic governance indicators be replaced with 
more action-oriented indicators which would be easier for poorer countries to implement.    
This paper is organized as follows: Section II summarizes the debates related to foreign aid 
effectiveness and conditionality. It describes the MCA model and clarifies the current status of 
the MCC foreign assistance program.   Section III discusses the findings from past empirical 
studies related to country performance on the MCC eligibility criteria.  Section IV outlines the 
data I use and my research design and empirical strategy.  Section V presents the results and 
discusses the policy implications of the findings.     
II. The Emergence of Selectivity as a New Form of Conditionality 
A discussion surrounding foreign aid conditionality cannot be separated from the larger debates 
related to aid effectiveness.   These debates have essentially resulted in impasses where 
authors representing different schools of thought have taken opposing positions on the 
effectiveness of foreign aid.  Today, there are generally three dominant perspectives related to 
bilateral and multilateral aid, namely:  Aid works, aid doesn’t work, and aid works under certain 
conditions.    
The first view comes from researchers who have found a positive relationship between aid and 
growth, but sometimes with diminishing returns after a certain threshold has been reached 
(Lensink and White, 2001; Islam, 2002; Dalgaard et al., 2004; Radalet, 2006; McGillivray, 2006).  
They argue that foreign aid and conditions should be tailored to each specific country, and that 
standardized tools such as governance indexes are ethnocentric and unable to capture the 
complex interaction of social, political, and economic factors in countries (Sachs, 2005; Merry, 
2010; Stewart, Wang, 2008).   They contend that more flexibility is needed in aid programs, and 
that performance should be measured over longer periods of time in order to allow for more 
rational long-term planning of public expenditures.   Proponents of this view argue that more 
funding is needed to scale up activities and remove the factors that cause countries to be 
trapped in persistent poverty (Collier, 2005; Sachs, 2005).  From this perspective, the focus 
should not be on macro-level policies, but instead on addressing local insufficiencies such as 
human capital, infrastructure, environmental capital, and security (Sachs, 2005).  Finally, 
advocates of this view argue that aid conditionality can lead to an inequitable use of resources 
by providing a disproportionate amount of funding to “top performing” countries, who by 
definition have less need than “poor performing” countries (Collier, 2005; Sachs, 2005).   
The second strand of literature claims aid has no impact on growth, and in some cases may 
actually stifle development (Easterly, Levine, Roodman, 2004; Easterly, 2005; Bourguignon, 
2007).  Supporters of this view cite widespread poverty in Africa and South Asia despite three 
decades of aid (McGillivray, 2006; Easterly, 2006).  Easterly (2006) argues donors have no idea 
which policies or combination of policies lead to growth, and that conditionality has the effect 
of placing all the blame on the recipient by creating an ever growing list of prerequisites that 
donors can later use to explain shortfalls.  Easterly (2006) has found that the traditional model 
of conditionality through structural adjustment lending has had little effect on recipient 
policies, which Svensson (2003) explains is the result of poor donor credibility resulting from 
their own incentive issues that prioritize disbursing funds regardless of country compliance.  
Conditionality models are also criticized for not encouraging the development of credible social 
contracts between foreign governments, due to the donor-recipient relationship that makes 
foreign government accountable to the multi-lateral donor agencies (Van de Walle, 2005).  
Finally, because the intended beneficiaries control neither the funds nor the decision-making 
processes involved in foreign aid programs, critics argue there can never be accountability and 
the level of knowledge exchange necessary for transformational development (Tendler, 1975; 
Easterly, 2006).    
The third view holds that aid supports growth in some circumstances, but not others, and aims 
to identify the critical characteristics in the recipient countries or donor practices that explain 
this difference (Tendler, 1975; Radelet, 2006; McGillivray, 2006).  This position was the basis for 
the traditional ex-post conditionality model used by the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, beginning the in 1980s, which sought to impose macroeconomic policy reforms 
on recipients of foreign assistance.   However, the failure of many of these programs to produce 
positive results resulted in a backlash against aid conditionality beginning in the late-1990s.  
Evidence citing the failure of ex-post conditionality typically refers to the non-compliance of 
recipient countries to implement the policy conditions attached to structural adjustment loans 
(Verschoor, 2006).  Conditionality took a new form with the advent of a World Bank report 
produced by Burnside and Dollar in 1998, “Assessing Aid: What Works, What Doesn’t, and 
Why,” which offered empirical evidence that aid is only effective in countries that had 
previously undertaken successful political and economic reforms (World Bank, 1998). The 
findings suggest that aid should be awarded to governments that meet criteria of attained 
governance through selectivity, i.e. past performance on a set of predetermined criteria.  Even 
strong critics of foreign aid have had a difficult time dismissing the relevance of selectivity, as 
seen with Easterly’s (2007) acknowledgement that “the idea that aid money directed to 
governments would be more productive if those governments had pro-development policies 
and institutions is very intuitive.”   
In 2002, the U.S. Government announced the new MCA foreign aid program stressing that it 
sought to transform U.S. foreign assistance by addressing a number of the key issues raised in 
previous debates (Hook, 2008).  Firstly, MCC employs a competitive process that rewards 
countries for past performance related to 16 eligibility indicators, i.e. selectivity, as opposed to 
the traditional model that imposes ex-ante conditions on recipient countries.  Secondly, a 
greater degree of flexibility and country-ownership were built into the model by allowing 
countries to choose which policy areas they want to improve upon to show their commitment 
to economic growth.  Flexibility and country-ownership were also incorporated into the 
implementation phase, whereby qualifying countries are required to design and implement 
their own programs with broad-based civil society involvement.   Finally, transparency is 
assured in aid allocation decisions by publishing country score cards on an annual basis showing 
the performance of all candidate countries on the eligibility indicators (Tarnoff, 2011).   
1. The MCC Model 
There was considerable debate around the appropriate institutional structure for MCC to 
ensure that it could implement its new non-traditional model of U.S. foreign aid effectively 
(Tarnoff, 2003).  After considering numerous options, including the placement of the MCA as a 
separate unit with the State Department or USAID, the Bush Administration proposed to create 
a new government entity to manage the initiative in 2002 (Tarnoff, 2003).   MCC has a CEO, 
confirmed by the Senate, and a staff of no more than 300 to maintain oversight and 
accountability standards (Tarnoff, 2006).   A Board of Directors oversees the program, which is 
chaired by the Secretary of State, and composed of the Secretary of Treasury, the U.S. Trade 
Representative, the Administrator of USAID, the CEO of the MCC, and four public members 
appointed by the President of the United States (Tarnoff, 2003).   
Unlike traditional mechanisms of aid allocation, which are predominately based on recipient 
need or donor strategic interest, MCC selects countries based on their performance on a range 
of third-party indicators (Table 1), grouped into three broad policy dimensions – Ruling Justly, 
Investing in People, and Promoting Economic Freedom.  (Johnson, 2006).  Originally, there were 
16 indicators in total; however, over the years new indicators have been added, bringing the 
current number of indicators to 20.   In choosing the indicators, MCC claims to look at several 
elements, including linkages to policies that the government can influence within a two to three 
year horizon and that – theoretically or empirically – lead to economic growth and poverty 
reduction (MCC, 2011).  The indicators originate from intergovernmental organizations and 
NGOs, and appear to strike a balance between conservative free-market ideals and more liberal 
social–development ideals (Stubbs, 2009).  MCC publishes annual country “score cards” 
displaying country performance on the indicators.  By using a transparent methodology, the 
MCC model endeavors to depoliticize the selection process (Radelet, 2006).  
 Table 1: Summary of MCC Indicators 
In order to be eligible for MCA funding, a candidate country must (1) fall within per capita 
income limits as identified by the World Bank’s International Development Association (IDA) for 
Low-Income Countries (LICs) and Lower-Middle-Income Countries (LMICs); (2) score above the 
median relative to other potentially eligible countries on at least half the indicators in each 
category; (3) score above the median on the Control of Corruption indicator; and (4) not be 
barred from receiving U.S. aid (MCC, 2011).  All countries which meet the first and second 
criteria are identified as candidate countries by MCC and divided into either low-income or 
lower-middle-income categories. Countries which pass the minimum indicator thresholds, and 
are selected as eligible countries by the MCA Board of Directors, are invited to develop and 
submit a proposal for an economic development program.  The proposed programs can focus 
Indicator Source
Political Rights Freedom House
Civil Liberties Freedom House
Voice and Accountability World Bank Institute
Government Effectiveness World Bank Institute
Rule of Law World Bank Institute
Control of Corruption World Bank Institute
Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate World Bank Group and UNESCO
Public Primary Education Spending National Governments
Public Expenditure on Health National Governments
Immunization Rates World Health Organization
Cost of Starting a Business World Bank Group
Inflation Multiple
Fiscal Policy National Governments and IMF
Trade Policy Heritage Foundation
Regulatory Quality World Bank Institute
Days to Start a Business World Bank Group
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Summary of MCC Indicators
on any development need as identified by an eligible government, but must aim to reduce 
poverty as the ultimate goal. 
There are two primary types of MCC grants: 
 Compact Grants: These are large, five-year grants for countries that pass MCC’s 
eligibility criteria, ranging from roughly $100 - $700 million.  
 Threshold Programs:  These are smaller grants awarded to countries that come close to 
passing the criteria, ranging from $5 - $60 million.  These grants are provided solely at 
the discretion of the MCC (MCC, 2011).   
If a country that has received assistance does not meet the eligibility criteria in a given year, but 
has not demonstrated a policy reversal or a pattern of actions inconsistent with the eligibility 
criteria, MCC will ask it to demonstrate efforts toward improvement by developing and 
implementing a policy improvement plan to address the areas of concern (MCC, 2011).  If a 
country does demonstrate a significant policy reversal, MCC may issue a warning, then suspend 
it from the program, or terminate its eligibility or aid package (MCC, 2011).  MCC has 
suspended assistance to six countries due to policy reversals (Tarnoff, 2011).   
As of May, 2011, MCC had awarded 22 compacts (valuing roughly $7.9 billion) and 23 threshold 
programs (valuing roughly $500 million).  In 2011, MCC announced it would allow eligible 
countries to submit a proposal for a second Compact Grant once they have completed the first 
program successfully.   
To summarize, the MCC model was designed to address a number of the critiques about foreign 
aid and its effectiveness.  The model has fully incorporated the concept of selectivity into its aid 
allocation model, but has added a number of additional characteristics that make it distinct 
from more traditional foreign aid models.  Some of the key distinctions include transparency in 
its country performance evaluation method, a greater commitment to country-ownership, and 
flexibility in policy reforms and program design and implementation.  However, the new model 
has yet to be tested over time to measure its effectiveness in promoting long-term policy 
reforms.    
III. Past Empirical Studies 
Due to its relative infancy, there is little literature on the effectiveness of foreign aid models 
using selectivity or countries’ past performance on identified policy criteria in aid allocations.  
Of the two known empirical studies that have looked specifically at the MCC effect (i.e. 
Johnson, 2006; Ohler, 2010), only Johnson (2006) evaluates this incentive effect across 
numerous indicators.  Although the study only had one year of post-treatment data, Johnson 
found evidence that candidate countries were more likely to improve their performance on the 
indicators and display greater absolute increases on these indicators than non-candidate 
countries (Johnson, 2006).  On five indicators—civil liberties, education expenditure, health 
expenditure, immunization rates, and regulatory quality—candidate countries were 25% more 
likely to reform after the announcement of the MCA program (Johnson, 2006).  He noted, 
however, that countries were more likely to make improvements on the social investment and 
economic indicators, than with the democratic governance indicators.  He concludes that the 
overall results suggest that the MCC incentive effect is real, as countries significantly increased 
their performance on the indicators after the announcement of the MCA program.   
Ohler’s (2010) study looked at country performance related only to the indicator on corruption, 
but took a more in-depth assessment at whether the incentive to reform weakens over time 
and whether higher costs of compliance undermine the MCC effect.  Using data through 2008, 
Ohler (2010) found that countries with unfavorable initial conditions were unlikely to respond 
to the MCC effect due to the remote chance of being compensated for their efforts.  She also 
found that MCC was successful in improving corruption immediately after the announcement of 
the program, but that this effect diminished over time.  She explained these findings as a result 
of the slow operational start of MCC and the organization’s declining budget allocations from 
Congress which increased the uncertainty of receiving a large enough reward in an acceptable 
timeframe given the candidate’s costs of eligibility compliance.   
Ohler (2010) looked to literature on the EU to find lessons related to ex-post conditionality as 
associated with candidature for EU membership.  She presents some interesting hypotheses 
that have relevance in the context of the MCA foreign aid model.   One of the suspected effects 
of ex-post aid is that once the country is rewarded, policy reforms may cease or even be 
reversed, as was seen in the case of various European countries (e.g. Italy, Greece, Portugal, 
Poland, and Slovakia), as well as with numerous recipients of traditional structural adjustment 
lending from the IMF and World Bank (Easterly, 2006; Ohler, 2010). 
To summarize, the past research on the MCC effect and other foreign aid models based on 
selectivity provides evidence that countries initially respond to the aid incentive by adopting 
policies identified by donors as critical to economic development.  However, once countries 
pass the hurdles necessary to acquire foreign aid, i.e. eligibility or aid recipient status, there is 
some evidence that countries may cease or even retract their reform efforts.  According to 
Mosley et al. (2004), selectivity may provide incentives to improve policies prior to receiving 
aid, but recipients would still have the option to reverse reforms after having been selected by 
donors. This paper attempts to test this assumption, through an empirical analysis, by 
measuring the effectiveness of the MCC model in influencing long-term policy reforms in 
recipient countries using the MCC model. 
IV. Data and Empirical Strategy   
Based on the previous empirical research specific to MCC and the criticisms related to foreign 
aid effectiveness, my study aims to answer the question:  Does country performance on policy 
reforms decrease after countries attain eligibility status or receive aid?  Although there have 
been a number of changes to the eligibility criteria over the years, MCC originally used 16 
indicators drawn from a number of independent sources. The indicators are broken up in to 
three categories, namely: Ruling Justly, Investing in People, and Promoting Economic Freedom.  
Table 1 provides a detailed description of the indicators and their sources.  Table 2 summarizes 
the units used in the indicators and the direction change associated with an increase in 
performance.   
I provide a correlation test, found in Table 3, which shows all of the Ruling Justly indicators of 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability are 
closely correlated to one another.  In addition, the Promoting Economic Freedom indicator of 
Regulatory Policy is also highly correlated with the Ruling Justly indicators.  This follows findings 
by Knoll (2006) which shows that only two underlying dimensions, the perceived ‘participatory 
dimension of governance’ and the perceived ‘overall quality of governance,’ are captured in the 
Ruling Justly indicators and the Regulatory Quality indicator.   Although this study does not aim 
to measure appropriateness of the indicators, it is worth noting this high correlation, which 
suggests similar elements are being captured in these indicators.  An example of this would be a 
government’s anti-corruption actions within a service sector could increase the Control of 
Corruption score, as well as the Government Effectiveness, Voice and Accountability, and 
Regulatory Policy score.  Therefore, this should not take away from my ability to measure the 
effect of eligibility or receiving aid on these indicators.  However, it will be difficult to discern 
which dimensions, and therefore which policies, led to this change.   
The main dataset used in my study consists of the thirteen indicators as well as country income 
data from the World Bank to identify country income categories1.  The data set covers years 
2000-2009.  Table 4 provides the list of countries included in this analysis.  Over this period of 
time, there were a total of 106 candidate countries, belonging to both the low-income and 
lower-middle-income categories, of which 32 were deemed eligible for funding.  Of the eligible 
countries, 19 received MCC Compact grants.   
In order to address my research question empirically, I will use the difference-in-difference (DD) 
method, which has become widely used in variety of areas of empirical microeconomics (Card, 
2005).  The impact of a policy on an outcome can be estimated by calculating a double 
difference, one over time (before-after) and one across subjects (between recipients and non-
recipients).  This method is particularly useful with country-level analyses, as it only requires 
                                                          
1 The indicators Political Rights, Civil Liberties, and Cost of Starting a Business were not included in DD 
analysis due to lack of data availability.   
 
aggregate data on the outcome variable (Card, 2005).  Using this method, the 13 indicators 
listed in Table 2 are observed for all candidate countries; however some of these countries are 
exposed to a treatment during this period (2000-2009) consisting of either attaining eligibility 
status or receiving MCC funding.   All other countries candidate countries represent the control 
group.  The average gain in the control group is subtracted from the average gain in the 
treatment group.  This removes the biases in the post-treatment period between the treatment 
and control group that could be the result of permanent differences between those groups, as 
well as biases from comparisons over time in the treatment group that could be the result of 
country-specific trends.  The average treatment effect can be calculated as the difference 
between two mean differences.  Assuming the outcome is the indicator level, and suppressing 
any notation for the country, I can write the DD estimator as: 
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    )  (  
         
    )] 
 
Where E is the expectation,    is the score of indicator j, {T,C} are the treatment and control 
indicators, and post and pre signify the years before and after the treatment occurred.  My 
analysis is broken into two separate parts, based on the two phases or “hurdles” countries can 
pass through in relation to the MCC model. First, I will look at the effect of passing the eligibility 
hurdle, i.e. attaining eligibility status, on country indicator performance.  In order to refine my 
results, I will disaggregate the treatment groups by low-income countries (LICs) and lower-
middle-income countries (LMICs).    Second, I will use a similar analysis to look at the next 
hurdle, i.e. receiving MCC funding, to measure its effect on country indicator performance.  In 
this analysis, the treatment groups consist of LICs and LMICs that have received MCC Compact 
grants2. Lastly, I use the same DD estimator to test whether this model provides similar results 
to the previous empirical studies in order to ensure its overall reliability.       
V. Results and Findings 
1. Effect of Eligibility Status on Country Performance 
My first estimation assumes, as is in line with the reasoning from Section II, that countries 
which become eligible cease to make significant continued progress on the indicators.  The 
underlying argument is that the incentive to continue to invest in the indicators is diminished 
once the countries pass this first "hurdle" and are deemed eligible.  Based on the MCC model, 
eligible countries must continue to stay above the median on at least 50% of the indicators, in 
addition to the control of corruption indicator, though no additional improvement is required.   
To test this hypothesis, I included all candidate and non-candidate countries within the low-
income and lower-middle-income categories in the analysis.  Countries which have been 
deemed eligible by meeting the required eligibility criteria represent the treatment groups, 
separated into LICs and LMICs, and all other candidate countries represent the control.  The 
empirical model is presented below:   
         (             )             
Where:   is the expected outcome;              is 0 for control countries and 1 or 
treatment countries;    is the year fixed effect;    is the country fixed effect; and     
represents the error term.  The results of these analyses are reported in Table 5 and Table 6.  
                                                          
2
 I do not include Threshold programs in this analysis, as these programs are specifically designed to help countries 
near eligibility status improve on one or two indicators, and will therefore provide biased results.   
The DD estimates provide evidence that MCC eligibility has a number of long-term effects 
related to specific governance indicators: 
1. Control of Corruption:  I begin by reporting my findings on the indicator relating to 
controlling corruption.  This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, as well as the dominance of the state by elites and private interests, through a 
number of public perception surveys (MCC, 2011).  I found that countries that become eligible 
for MCC funding continue to make progress on the Control of Corruption indicator after they 
become eligible.  The Control of Corruption index score has a range between -2.5 to 2.5.  Among 
LICs, the Control of Corruption score increased by 0.06 points at a ten percent significance level.  
Among LMICs, the score increased by a more substantial 0.20 points at a one percent 
significance level.  In other words, LMICs increase their score more than three times the level of 
LICs after becoming eligible for MCC funding.  This finding is particularly important when 
considering that the mean score for the Control of Corruption indicator among LMICs is only 
0.12.   
The results suggest that both groups of countries are making continued anti-corruption efforts 
after becoming eligible, with LMICs making continued significant progress in this area.  Poorer 
countries are either unable to make significant gains in this area or choose to shift their focus 
once they pass the eligibility threshold.  One explanation for this effect could be that the 
incentive for poorer countries to continue to invest their limited resources in anti-corruption 
efforts is outweighed by more pressing and perhaps more tangible indicators, such as health 
expenditures.  Comprehensive anti-corruption programs can be resource intensive, as seen 
through a number of MCC Threshold programs aiming to improve country performance on this 
indicator.  These programs require significant policy reforms in a variety of areas, including tax 
and customs administration, public procurement, the judicial system, and related capacity-
building investments in the relevant public institutions (MCC, 2011).  Budgets for these MCC 
Threshold programs range from $12 million to over $30 million (MCC, 2011).  Faced with the 
high political and financial costs required for effective anti-corruption programs, poorer 
governments may choose to invest in more concrete programs that are easier to implement 
and have greater pay-offs in the short-run.      
2. Health Expenditures:  This indicator measures the government’s commitment to 
investing in the health and well-being of its people by measuring the percent of GDP being 
allocated to public health expenditures.  My findings show health expenditures among LICs are 
positively affected by MCC eligibility.  LICs show an increase of 0.24 percent of GDP at a five 
percent significance level.  This represents a 7 percent increase above the LIC mean for this 
indicator score, representing a significant advancement.   
This finding of eligible LICs increasing their performance on public health expenditures is 
consistent with the previous empirical research, which found LICs near the eligibility threshold 
tended to focus on improving their performance on the social indicators in order to become 
eligible.  My finding shows that LICs continue to increase health expenditures even after they 
become eligible, which cannot be easily explained by the incentive effects of the MCC program, 
as eligible countries only stay above the median relative to other countries in their same 
income category.  Perhaps one explanation is that the majority of LICs are all focusing heavily 
on this indicator, which could continually induce countries to increase their health budgets in 
order to stay above the median.  In 2009, 14 of the 19 eligible LICs were all above the median 
on this indicator, suggesting the large majority of them are focusing heavily on health 
expenditures.  It is understandable that LICs would focus on health expenditures as a way to 
meet one of the 16 eligibility criteria as they can easily increase their performance on this 
indicator by simply diverting funds from other government programs into health.  In general, 
LICs already have the policies in place and the institutional structures to absorb health funding, 
unlike some of the other indicators that may require the adoption of new polices and the 
creation of new structures, such as Control of Corruption.  Additionally, it is unlikely that 
increasing health budgets will be met with political resistance in the country due to the high 
level of populist appeal and likely support from other bilateral and multilateral donors.  
Therefore, for poor countries, increasing health budgets continues to be an easy way to both 
improve indicator scores while meeting their political objectives. 
3. Primary Education Expenditures:  This indicator measures government primary 
education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. I found that expenditures on primary 
education did not significantly change among LICs; however, among LMICs the percent of GDP 
going towards primary education expenditures decreased by 0.27 percent after they became 
eligible, at a ten percent significance level.   
In order to better understand the trends in education expenditures among LMICs, I have 
created a time path chart (Figure 1) which displays the DD estimated change in education 
expenditures among eligible LMICs before and after they become eligible for MCC funding, with 
the 90 percent significance levels represented by the dotted lines.  Figure 1 shows that prior to 
becoming eligible for MCC funding, the annual changes in the percent of GDP being allocated 
for primary education expenditures was negative, going from a  -0.65 percent decrease two 
years before becoming eligible, to roughly a -0.03 percent decrease the year before becoming 
eligible. Although still a negative annual change, this represents a smaller reduction in 
education expenditures as a percentage of GDP in the two years prior to becoming eligible.  
Among eligible LMICs, 
reductions in education 
expenditures began to 
increase again, going from 
just under -0.03 percent to      
-0.33 percent two years after 
attaining eligibility status.   
The results suggest, firstly, 
that eligible LMICs were 
decreasing the percentage of GDP allocated to primary education both before and after 
attaining eligibility status.  However, when we look at trends just prior to becoming eligible, 
LMICs made improvement on this indicator as seen by the reduction in education expenditures 
as a percent of GDP significantly decreasing prior to the countries attaining eligibility status.  
Once the countries attained eligibility status, annual reductions in education expenditures as a 
percent of GDP began to increase again.   
 
Figure 1: Education Expenses Time Path (LMICs) 
 
It should be noted, that of all the indicators being measured, the Primary Education 
expenditures have the greatest amount of missing data, which maybe resulting in unreliable 
results for this analysis.  However, of the data that is available, there is a clear trend of 
decreasing education budgets as a percent of GDP.  One explanation is that GDP growth 
throughout this period may have had a negative impact on country performance on this 
indicator, if education expenditures did not increase relative to GDP growth.   
A second explanation for this effect of eligibility could be that LMICs strategically put more 
resources into primary education prior to eligibility in order to increase their chances of passing 
the eligibility hurdle.  Then, LMICs began investing less in this area once they were able to 
measure their relative performance among competing countries and determined they could 
reduce investments in primary education, presumably to invest in other areas.  In this sense, 
countries can use the information related to the performance of their competition on the 
eligibility criteria, acquired through the annual scorecards, to make strategic decisions and 
improve their relative position.  Instead of continuing to invest in an area which they are 
already over-performing on compared to their competition, they can divert these funds to 
programs aimed at improving their performance on other indicators. 
4. Days to Start a Business:  This indicator measures the number of calendar days it takes 
to comply with all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and 
formally operate an industrial or commercial business (MCC, 2011).  According to my findings, 
there is no significant change among eligible LICs.  Among LMIC, on the other hand, my findings 
show they reduced the time to start a business by over 15 days after passing the eligibility 
hurdle, and this is seen at a one percent significance level.    This represents a considerable 
improvement, as the range for this indicator among all LMICs is between 12 and 52 days.     
This result shows that reaching eligibility status among LMICs has a considerable effect on 
decreasing the number of days required to start a business.  There have been a number of 
anecdotal stories that show the effects of eligible country efforts to reduce this figure, usually 
through initiatives to streamline procedures, remove unnecessary administrative steps, and 
establish one-stop offices to that provide assistance to entrepreneurs in setting up their 
businesses (MCC, 2011).  Some examples of these include Albania that reduced the average 
number of days to start a business from 41 in 2003 to five in 2009, and Cape Verde which 
decreased its average start-up time from 52 days in 2005 to an astonishing one hour in 2010 
(MCC, 2011).  The large improvement in this indicator among eligible LMICs, suggests these 
countries are able to affect this indicator in fairly short period of time, and that they are able to 
get resounding support on a political level.  This is a significant effect of MCC eligibility when 
considering the long-term economic growth benefits of this indicator, and significance in 
reducing corruption due to restrictive administrative procedures related to starting a business 
(Madani, 2010).  
5. Fiscal Policy:  This indicator gauges the government’s commitment to prudent fiscal 
management and private sector growth by measuring general government net 
lending/borrowing.  Net lending/borrowing is calculated as revenues minus total expenditures   
as a percent of GDP, averaged over a three-year period.  I found no significant change among 
LMICs, but among LICs there was an increase in 4.55 percent of GDP at a ten percent 
significance level.   
6. Government Effectiveness:  This indicator measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its 
stated policies (MCC, 2011).  The indicator is an index score ranging -2.5 to 2.5 by combining up 
to 14 different assessments and surveys (MCC, 2011).   Eligible LMICs slightly increased their 
performance on the Government Effectiveness indicator by 0.09, with a significance level of ten 
percent.  Considering the mean for LMICs is -0.07, this still represents substantial improvement.   
7. Regulatory Policy:  This indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development (MCC, 2011). The indicator is an index score ranging -2.5 to 2.5 by combining up 
to 14 different assessments and surveys (MCC, 2011). There was an increase of 0.10 on the 
Regulatory Policy indicator at a ten percent significance level.  Considering the range of scores 
among LMICs is between -0.66 and 0.42, this represents a substantial improvement.   
As noted in Section IV, Regulatory Policy is strongly correlated to the Ruling Justly indicators of 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability, as 
shown in Table 3, which are also measured in a similar fashion using a compilation of 
perception-based surveys.  Previous empirical research suggests that these indicators are only 
measuring two dimensions of democratic governance, i.e. ‘participatory dimension of 
governance’ and the perceived ‘overall quality of governance,’ (Knoll, 2006).  Therefore, with 
the Ruling Justly indicators, as well as the Regulatory Policy indicator, it is difficult to ascertain 
the dimensions of democratic governance being measured or related policies by countries that 
have resulted in an increased score. 
To summarize, there were some distinct differences between how the LICs and LMICs 
responded to the MCC model after becoming eligible.  LICs showed statistically significant 
improvement in the areas of Control of Corruption, Health Expenditures, and Fiscal Policy.  
LMICs also improved their scores in the area of Control of Corruption, but in addition had 
significant improvement with the indicators related to Government Effectiveness, Regulatory 
Policy, and Days to Start a Business.  Both categories of countries showed a reduction in the 
percentage of GDP being allocated for Primary Education expenditures. 
2. Effect of Receiving Funding on Country Performance 
My second estimation assumes, as is in line with the reasoning from Section II, that countries 
which become aid recipients cease to make significant continued progress on the indicators, 
and may even begin to decline in certain areas.  The underlying argument is that the incentive 
to continue to invest in the indicators is diminished significantly once countries pass this second 
"hurdle" and are rewarded with aid.  Based on the MCC model, aid recipient countries must 
continue to stay eligible by staying above the median on at least 50% of the indicators, in 
addition to the control of corruption indicator.  However, if the performance of aid recipients 
begins to fall, but they have not shown significant reversal of previous policies (e.g. ceasing 
anti-corruption programs altogether), they are only required to develop a plan to show how 
they will endeavor to address the compliance issues.   
To test this hypothesis, I included all candidate and non-candidate countries within the low-
income and lower-middle-income categories in the analysis.  Countries which have received aid 
(i.e. an MCC Compact) represent the treatment groups, separated into LICs and LMICs, and all 
other countries represent the control.  The empirical model is presented below:   
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Where    is the expected outcome;      is 0 for control countries and 1 for treatment 
countries;    is the year fixed effect;    is the country fixed effect; and     represents the error 
term.  Table 7 and Table 8 show the results for this analysis.  
1. Control of Corruption:  I begin by reporting my findings on the indicator relating to 
controlling corruption.  This indicator measures the extent to which public power is exercised 
for private gain, as well as the dominance of the state by elites and private interests, through a 
number of public perception surveys (MCC, 2011).  For this indicator, there was no significant 
change among LICs; however, LMIC aid recipients increased their Control of Corruption score by 
0.34 at a one percent significance level.  This is very substantial when considering the range for 
this treatment group is only between -0.36 and 0.77.     
These results are consistent with my findings related to eligible countries, where LICs showed 
substantially less improvement than LMICs on the Control of Corruption indicator.  This suggests 
that once LICs become aid recipients, they no longer continue to make efforts in this area, 
although results for LICs are not statistically significant in this analysis.  As in my first analysis 
related to the effect of eligibility on country performance, I assume that LICs are less inclined to 
continue to focus on anti-corruption efforts given their limited resources and large number of 
other priority areas.  LMICs, on the other hand, show continued improvement in this area, 
which shows a distinction between how the two country groups respond to the MCC program 
over time.  Perhaps, for LMICs, continuous investment in anti-corruption programs is more 
feasible given their higher income levels.  This could potentially be explained by LMICs having 
more to gain from anti-corruption efforts by way of increased investments by private sector 
firms, whom may not be as interested to invest in poorer countries due to a variety of factors 
(e.g. poor infrastructure, weaker labor force, and political instability).  LMICs may also have 
more political latitude to continue to invest in the more ambiguous Ruling Justly indicators, 
because the quality of their social services, represented in the Investing in People category, has 
reached a high enough level.  My assumption is that once countries reach a high enough level 
related to government social services, such as health and education, they are more willing to 
invest in the more ambiguous Ruling Justly indicators.      
2. Government Effectiveness:  This indicator measures the quality of public services, the 
quality of the civil service and its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to its 
stated policies (MCC, 2011).  The indicator is an index score ranging -2.5 to 2.5 by combining up 
to 14 different assessments and surveys (MCC, 2011).   I found that among aid-recipient LMICs 
the score for Government Effectiveness increased by 0.11 points at a ten percent significance 
level. There was no statistically significant change among recipient LICs.  My first analysis, 
related to the effect of eligibility on this indictor, also found that LMICs made continued 
progress in this area.  This suggests that, similar to the Control of Corruption indictor, LMICs 
continue to make progress in the more ambiguous Ruling Justly indicators, even after receiving 
aid.  However, due to the high correlation between the Ruling Justly indictors and this indicator 
of Government Effectiveness, it is impossible to ascertain what specific actions by the 
government lead to changes in these indicators.  
3. Primary Education Expenditures:  This indicator measures government primary 
education expenditures as a percentage of GDP. I found a similar reduction in Primary 
Education expenditures for both LICs and LMICs.  LIC recipients decreased their spending in 
primary education by 0.36 percent of their GDP after receiving funding, at a significance level of 
ten percent.  Similarly, LMIC recipients decreased their budgets by 0.45 percent of their GDP 
after receiving funding with a significance level of one percent.   
These results further support the findings from the first analysis related to the effect of 
eligibility, which showed a general decrease in primary education expenditures as a percent of 
GDP among LMICs that became eligible.  However, with these results, it now shows even LICs 
are spending less on education as a percent their GDP.   It is unclear why both eligible and aid 
recipient countries are decreasing primary education funding as percent of GDP.  As noted in 
my first analysis, there is a significant amount of missing year-to-year data for this indicator, 
however there is a clear downward trend among both LIC and LMIC countries.  One potential 
explanation is that GDP growth during the two phases, i.e. eligibility and recipient, may have 
had a negative impact on country performance on this indicator if education expenditures did 
not increase relative to GDP growth.  This hypothesis should be tested in subsequent studies 
related to the Primary Education Expenditures indicator, to try and identify if GDP growth or 
other unknown factors are leading to this surprising outcome.  Specifically, future analyses 
should test for an interaction effect between receiving MCC aid and GDP, and secondly 
measure the relationship between annual GDP variations and performance on Primary 
Education expenditures.   
Another explanation for the effect of aid recipient status on primary education expenditures 
could be that LICs and LMICs have chosen to shift resources out of primary education to invest 
in areas where they needed to make greater improvement.  This strategic behavior of countries 
is supported by the finding from my first analysis related to LMICs, which shows education 
expenditures as a percent of GDP increased drastically just prior to eligibility, and then began to 
decrease again after the countries passed the eligibility hurdle.  Countries are able to gauge 
their relative performance on each indicator compared to their competition using the annual 
score cards, which may lend to this type of strategic behavior by governments in order to 
increase their standing among recipient countries.   
4. Regulatory Policy:  This indicator measures the ability of the government to formulate 
and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development (MCC, 2011). The indicator is an index score ranging -2.5 to 2.5 by combining up 
to 14 different assessments and surveys (MCC, 2011).  I found that LICs showed a 0.11 increase 
in score in this area, at a significance level of one percent.  Additionally, LMICs showed a similar 
0.11 percent increase, however the significance level was just over the ten percent cutoff.    
As noted in Section IV, Regulatory Policy is strongly correlated to the Ruling Justly indicators of 
Control of Corruption, Government Effectiveness, Rule of Law, and Voice and Accountability, as 
shown in Table 3, which are also measured in a similar fashion using a compilation of 
perception-based surveys.  Previous empirical research suggests that these indicators are only 
measuring two dimensions of democratic governance, i.e. ‘participatory dimension of 
governance’ and the perceived ‘overall quality of governance,’ (Knoll, 2006).  Therefore, with 
the Ruling Justly indicators, as well as the indicator related to Regulatory Policy, it is difficult to 
ascertain the dimensions of democratic governance being measured or related policies by 
countries that have led to improvement in this area.   
5. Days to Start a Business:  This indicator measures the number of calendar days it takes 
to comply with all procedures that are officially required for an entrepreneur to start up and 
formally operate an industrial or commercial business (MCC, 2011).  Among aid-recipient LICs, 
the number of days required to start a business was reduced by 7.15 (representing an 
improvement), at a ten percent significance level.  I did not find a statistically significant finding 
for LMIC recipients related to this indicator.   
This may represent another distinction between the two country treatment groups, as they are 
incentives to address this indicator occur at different stages.  My first analysis related to the 
eligibility effects on this indicator showed a substantial decrease of 15.52 days for this indicator 
among LMICs, whereas there was only a small statistically non-significant improvement seen 
among LICs.   The results for this analysis show that LICs tend to make their greatest gains in 
reducing the number of days to start a business after they receive funding, whereas LMICs 
make their greatest gains after they become eligible, but before they receive MCC aid.  This can 
perhaps be explained, firstly, by LICs continuing to have higher priorities in other areas once 
they become eligible, and may require increased inducements and funding to support policies 
and administrative reforms to reduce the days to start a business.  A number of LIC aid 
recipients have included this policy reform as part of their MCC Compact activities, (e.g. Cape 
Verde), therefore directly linking improvement on this indicator to MCC aid.  LMICs, which 
presumably have more flexibility in the indicators they address prior to receiving aid, may be 
more inclined to tackle this indicator due to their higher levels of income.  Additionally, LMICs 
potentially have greater short-term gains from improving the business environment if there is 
significant private sector interest and growth in their countries.  Finally, as mentioned in my 
first analysis, the large improvement in this indicator among eligible LMICs, suggests these 
countries are able to affect this indicator in fairly short period of time and gain political support 
for these efforts, which may not be the case for LICs due to institutional and financial 
constraints related to administrative reform relative to more pressing social concerns. 
To summarize, there were distinct differences between how the LICs and LMICs responded to 
the MCC model after receiving aid. LMICs showed continued improvement in the Ruling Justly 
indicators of Control of Corruption and to a small extent Government Effectiveness.  LICs 
showed minimal improvement in the Regulatory Policy and substantial improvement in Days to 
Start a Business.  Both LICs and LMICs reduced their expenditures for Primary Education after 
receiving aid.  The general trend in indicator performance suggests that LMIC recipients 
continue to invest in the democratic governance indicators, whereas LICs shift from increasing 
health expenditures (while they were eligible) to focusing on two of the Promoting Economic 
Freedom indicators, most notably Days to Start a Business.  Overall, there is no significant 
decline in performance among countries after they receive aid, except for a continued decline 
in education expenditures, which should be further explored in subsequent studies.  There 
does, however, appear to be a slowing of progress among LMICs after receiving aid, which go 
from improving on four indicators within the Ruling Justly and Promoting Economic Freedom 
categories during eligibility, to only making improvement on the Control of Corruption and to a 
small extent Government Effectiveness.   Furthermore, as noted within this analysis and 
consistent with previous empirical research related to the Ruling Justly indicators, it is possible 
that these two indicators are measuring the same government policies due to the high 
correlation between the Ruling Justly indicators.     
3. Effect of the Announcement of MCC Program on Country Performance 
My final analysis is conducted to test whether my regression model will render similar results to 
the previous studies related to the MCC effect, as measured by the change in country 
performance on the indicators before and after the announcement of MCC in late 2002.  This is 
important as the results from this analysis show some differences in how countries perform on 
the indicators after they become eligible or receive aid compared to the previous studies that 
looking at how they performed after the announcement of MCC, irrespective of their eligibility 
or recipient status.  The previous studies, which only looked at LICs, showed these countries 
focused heavily on the social indicators within the Investing in People category after the 
announcement of MCC as a strategy to become eligible in a short period of time.  The 
assumption is that because a number of the social indicators are measured by government 
spending in health and education, immediate changes in budget allocations can allow poor 
countries to quickly improve performance.   
As with the previous studies my analysis only focused LICs, because when MCC was announced 
only countries within the low-income category were eligible for funding, and therefore, only 
LICs would have been incentivized to increase performance on the published eligibility criteria 
in order to become eligible for MCC funding.  The empirical model is presented below:   
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Where    is the expected outcome;                   is 0 for years 2000 – 2002 (i.e. 
before the announcement of the MCA program), and 1 for years 2003 – 2009 (i.e. after the 
announcement of the MCA program);    is the year fixed effect;    is the country fixed effect; 
and      represents the error term.    
My results, as presented in Table 9, capture an incentive effect across a range of indicators, but 
most certainly provide similar findings to the previous studies.  There is a slight increase in the 
Voice & Accountability score among low-income countries after the announcement of MCC, 
however the actual DD estimate is quite small, at .05 and ten percent significance level.  For the 
Investing in People indicators, Immunization Rates, Health Expenditures, and Girls’ Primary 
Education all show substantial improvements at a one percent significance level.  National 
immunization rates increased by 11.1 percent, public health expenditures by .49 percent of 
GDP, and the percent of females completing primary education increased by 18.4 percent. 
These findings are consistent with the previous empirical studies.  Improvement was also seen 
with the Trade Policy indicator, which measures a country’s openness to international trade 
based on average tariff rates and non-tariff barriers to trade.  This score increased by 4.6 points 
out of 100 at a one percent significance level.   Finally, improvement was seen with the Inflation 
indicator, at a one percent significance level, that showed LICs decreased their inflation rates by 
14 percent after the announcement of MCC.   
It should also be noted that another potential reason countries tended to focus on the social 
indicators is because prior to the MCC announcement, accurate data may not have been 
collected regularly on these indicators.  An example of this was seen in Madagascar where 
performance on Health Expenditures was increased by simply collecting data on local and 
regional government health budgets that had not previously been included in this figure.  
Similar anecdotal evidence exists for Primary Education expenditures and Girls’ Primary 
Education completion rates.   
VI. Discussion 
The concept of selectivity has gained wide support from policy makers who have begun to 
replace the traditional aid model of ex-post conditionality with one that requires countries to 
put in place pro-growth policies prior to receiving aid, i.e. ex-ante conditionality or selectivity.  
The justification being that the traditional ex-post model has not been effective at influencing 
national policy, as shown through a number of highly influential empirical studies.  The MCC 
model is the first to adopt selectivity in its entirety, basing aid allocation decisions on country 
past performance on a set of governance indicators.  MCC has also made efforts to address the 
issue of non-transparency in aid allocation decisions by publishing indicator performance for all 
candidate countries.  This is a critical component of the program as countries need to be aware 
of their relative performance to each other in order to determine which policies to focus on in 
order to have the best chance of becoming eligible.  Lastly, the MCC model addresses the 
criticisms of traditional foreign aid related to conditionality, country-ownership, and flexibility 
in order to ensure reforms are more appropriate within each country-specific context.  MCC 
addresses these issues by providing a list of governance indicators which countries can choose 
from to demonstrate their commitment to economic development by passing the median on 50 
percent of the indicators, in addition to the Control of Corruption indicator.   This new foreign 
aid model has made some significant changes to how aid is allocated, and by doing so has 
altered the traditional donor-recipient relationship.  This new relationship allows for increased 
autonomy in policy decisions by the recipient countries, and allows them to design and 
implement their own programs in accordance with their country-specific development plans.  
However, little is known about the long term effectiveness in influencing country policies of a 
foreign aid model based on selectivity.   
My study found some general trends among eligible and recipient countries, as well as 
differences between LICs and LMICs, and offers insight into the incentive effects occurring in a 
selectivity-based foreign aid model. Firstly, the model seems to be effective in encouraging a 
minimal level of performance on the Control of Corruption indicator, which is the one indicator 
that is required by all countries to become eligible and receive funding.  However, LICs tend to 
reduce their effort in this area after becoming eligible, and even more so after receiving aid, 
and instead choose to focus their efforts on more tangible indicators such as Health 
Expenditures or Days to Start a Business.  LMICs on the other hand, focus almost exclusively on 
the Control of Corruption and Government Effectiveness indicators once they receive funding.  
Lastly, both country income groups appear to be decreasing their overall efforts on the 
indicators as they pass through the two hurdles related to this model, i.e. eligibility and 
recipient status, suggesting that the incentive to continue reform efforts decreases after each 
of these phases. These findings raise some concerns as to the long-term effectiveness of the 
model in promoting continued reform efforts, as well as potential equity issues inherent in the 
model’s indicators.  Below I present some recommendations to address these potential 
weaknesses. 
My results show that although there are no major reversals in country performance related to 
the indicators, their progress appears to wane significantly after receiving aid to the point that 
statistically significant and substantial increases are only seen in the Control of Corruption 
indicator, among LMICs, and Days to Start a Business among LICs.  This is concerning as it raises 
the possibility that countries are not continuing to make policy improvements as the designers 
of the MCC model intended.  Ohler (2010) found the model is effective at incentivizing policy 
improvements among countries close to reaching eligibility status, and my findings show the 
model is successful in inducing eligible and recipient countries to meet a minimum level of 
policy performance in order to hold their relative standing.  In this way, the model appears to 
be an improvement over traditional models, as there have not been significant policy reversals.  
Since countries are able to gauge their relative performance against the performance of others 
using the annual score cards, they can be strategic in their allocation of resources to the policy 
indicators.  This was apparent with the large increases in health expenditures, immunization 
rates, and girls’ primary education completion rates after the announcement of the MCC 
program in 2002, and then a reduction in these areas among countries after becoming eligible, 
and even more so after receiving funding.  The continuous reduction in primary education 
expenditures among both eligible and recipient countries may also be the result of this type of 
strategic behavior, though this conclusion requires further empirical research to determine its 
accuracy.  At any rate, the model is by no means a failure, but should be refined to induce 
continued improvement among a wider group of countries.  Two specific issues are presented 
below along with recommendations to addressing them in a manner consistent with the MCC 
philosophy of selectivity, transparency, and country ownership.   
Firstly, the model is based on countries competing amongst one another for MCC funding, and 
funding levels have decreased significantly from their original projections (Stubbs, 2009).  The 
fact that only countries near the eligibility threshold are induced to improve their performance 
means the actual group of countries competing for the funding could potentially be quite small 
(Ohler, 2010). The incentive structure in place through this model is quite complex.  Even 
though it uses medians instead of averages to theoretically pull in a larger pool of countries, 
eligible countries must pass on 50 percent of the indicators at one time, in addition to the 
Control of Corruption indicator. This may be quite difficult for a large number of countries.  
Coupled with the awareness that the MCC budget is significantly smaller than originally 
announced in 2002, an even greater number of countries are less likely to compete as the 
eligibility or compliance cost of investing in the key policy areas outweighs the chances of 
receiving an adequate aid award in a politically feasible time period (Ohler, 2010).  The 
consequence of the above mentioned factors is a dynamic model where a fairly small group of 
top-performing countries, presently at 32 out of 106, will be able to pass on enough indictors to 
become eligible.  This will subsequently result in a relatively low level of competition among the 
eligible and recipient countries to continuously improve their performance, as seen through the 
results in this analysis.   
Secondly, as these top performers compete with one another, the median will drift further and 
further up, making it increasingly difficult for the countries in most need to catch up.  The result 
is that the same countries are routinely eligible for MCA funding, whereas others will never be 
able to pass the first hurdle of eligibility.  This can be seen by MCC’s recent announcement in 
2010 that it will allow second Compact Grants, the first of which is going to Cape Verde, while a 
number of other Compact Grants are going to countries which previously received Threshold 
programs.  My hypothesis is this decision by MCC was made out of necessity as the organization 
predicted that the pool of eligible countries may be stabilizing at around the current number.  
This raises serious concerns related to the equitability of this model as well as its long-term 
justification.  Organizations that select recipients who will most likely benefit from their 
programs based on need, will maximize the social return of the investment (Bell, 2002).  
Conversely, using a creaming method, such as selectivity, may lead to little or no substantial 
social benefit as the recipients are already likely to experience the highest outcomes in the 
absence of the program (Bell, 2002).  For this reason, the MCC model should be refined to 
strengthen the incentive effects for countries where starting conditions are more unfavorable, 
as this will allow for the greatest social benefit from the U.S. government’s investments.  
In order to address the above mentioned issues, it is first recommended that LMICs be removed 
from the candidate pool as they likely have access to other sources of funding and arguably 
have less need than countries in the low-income category.  Currently, 25 percent of MCC 
funding is allocated to LMICs, so this will significantly reduce the scarcity of resources available 
for the remaining LICs and increase the incentive for countries to enter the competition.  
Additionally, I recommend that the Threshold programs be terminated, which currently use 10 
percent of the MCC budget, and these programs do not follow MCC’s principles of selectivity 
and transparency, and take away from the Compact Grant budget.  Threshold programs are 
awarded to countries close to reaching eligibility status at the full discretion of the MCC Board, 
and could lead to allocation decisions based U.S. foreign policy interests as opposed to country 
performance.  These two measures will increase the MCC budget by 35 percent for the 
remaining estimated 75 countries in the low-income category.  This will significantly increase 
the incentive power of the program to pull in a larger pool of countries to compete through 
policy improvements.   
To further address the small competitive pool and equity issues, I recommend two options.  The 
first, which would be easier from an institutional standpoint as it requires less of MCC’s 
resources, would be to allocate funding on a regional basis, e.g. Latin America, Africa, Eastern 
Europe, and Asia.  This will create an added inducement for countries with unfavorable starting 
conditions to strive to catch up with their neighboring countries, as the likelihood of being 
rewarded for their efforts will increase due to the smaller number of competing countries with 
arguably similar constraints to growth.  The second option would be to design eligibility 
thresholds relative to each country’s performance, i.e. measuring composite improvements of 
scores in absolute terms over a period of time (e.g. 2-3 years).  Those that show the greatest 
overall improvement, measured by an aggregate score, would be eligible for funding.  This 
would create a highly equitable model that would entice all countries, regardless of their initial 
standing, to compete for the funds.   
Finally, it is recommended that MCC review the validity of the various Ruling Justly indicators 
and the indicator of Regulatory Policy to ensure they are not, as Knoll (2006) suggests, all 
measuring the same two dimensions of democratic governance.  My findings also seem to 
support this as shown with the high correlation between them.  More importantly, my findings 
suggest LICs are not focusing on the democratic governance indicators, perhaps because they 
have more pressing needs, or because these indicators are too ambiguous and potentially 
represent a risky investment by poorer governments.  Therefore, I recommend that MCC 
attempt to find more actionable governance indicators, geared towards LICs, which would 
allow them to see how a specific investment of their limited resources would result in an 
improved standing.    
I conclude by stressing that the MCC model, which uses competitive selectivity and promotes 
the principles of transparency, country-ownership, and flexibility, offers promise over the 
traditional ex-post conditionality model.  My study suggests that the model is effective at 
inducing continued policy improvements among eligible countries and to a lesser extent 
recipient countries.  Refinements to the model should be made in order to raise the 
competitiveness within the eligible and recipient country pools and increase the equitability of 
the MCC program.  To do this, I suggest removing the LMICs from the candidate pool, and 
making allocation decisions based on regional budget allocations or measuring individual 
country improvements in absolute terms over a period of time. 
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Table 1:  Indicator Detailed Descriptions 
 
Indicator Data Description
Political Rights
Data on Political Rights were obtained from Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2003-2010  reports, and 
cover years 2002-2009.  This indicator reflects the 0-40 (40="most free") scale.  The data are also available 
online at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15.
Civil Liberties
Data on Civil Liberties were obtained from Freedom House's Freedom in the World 2003-2010  reports, and 
cover years 2002-2009.  This indicator reflects the 0-60 (60="most free") scale .  The data are available online 
at http://www.freedomhouse.org/template.cfm?page=15.
Control of Corruption
Data on Control of Corruption were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World 
Bank/Brookings Institution, 1996-2010.  Data are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009, and can be 
accessed online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Government 
Effectiveness
Data on Government Effectiveness were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World 
Bank/Brookings Institution, 1996-2010.  Data are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009, and can be 
accessed online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Rule of Law
Data on Rule of Law  were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World Bank/Brookings 
Institution, 1996-2010.  Data are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009, and can be accessed online at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Voice and 
Accountability
Data on Voice and Accountability were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World 
Bank/Brookings Institution, 1996-2010.  Data are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009, and can be 
accessed online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Immunization Rates
Data on Immunization Rates were obtained from the World Health Organization and the United Nations 
Children's Fund and are available for 1990-2009.  These data are available online at 
http://www.who.int/entity/immunization_monitoring/data/coverage_estimates_series.xls.
Health Expenditures
Data on Health Expenditures were obtained from the World Health Organization (WHO) and are available for 
2001-2008 (with 2009 coverage for some countries).  The indicator measures general government health 
expenditure (GGHE) as a percentage of GDP. The components of the data (GGHE and GDP) are available 
from the country pages located online at http://www.who.int/nha/country/en/.
Primary Education 
Expenditures
Data on Primary Education Expenditures are available for 1999-2010.  The data were obtained from the 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) or the national governments. 
Girls Primary 
Completion Rates
Data on Girls' Primary Education Completion Rates were obtained from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and are available for 1999-2010.  The most recent year 
available varies by country.  These data are also available online at http://stats.uis.unesco.org/.
Regulatory Quality
Data on Regulatory Quality were obtained from the Worldwide Governance Indicators by the World 
Bank/Brookings Institution, 1996-2010.  Data are available for 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002-2009, and can be 
accessed online at http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp.
Days to Start a 
Business
Data on Days to Start a Business were obtained from the International Finance Corporation's Doing Business 
reports, 2004-2011.  Data are available for 2003-2010 and can be obtained online at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
Cost of Starting a 
Business
Data on the Cost of Starting a Business were obtained from the International Finance Corporation's Doing 
Business  reports, 2004-2011.  Data are available for 2003-2010 and can be obtained online at 
http://www.doingbusiness.org/.
Trade Policy
Data on Trade Policy were obtained from the Heritage Foundation's Index of Economic Freedom , 1995-2011. 
Data are available for 1995-2010. This indicator reflects the 0-100 (100="most free") scale.  The data are 
available online at http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/09/trade-freedom-continues-to-advance-
barely and http://www.heritage.org/Index/
Inflation
Data on Inflation were obtained from the International Monetary Fund's Oct. 2010 World Economic Outlook 
(WEO) and are available for 1995-2009.  The data measure annual percentage change averages for the year, 
not end-of-period data.  The WEO database can be accessed online at 
http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28.
Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policy data are available for 1997-2009 and come from the International Monetry Fund's Oct. 2010 
World Economic Outlook database. The indicator is general government net lending/borrowing as a percent of 
GDP, averaged over a three year period. Net lending / borrowing is calculated as revenue minus total 
expenditure. The WEO database can be accessed online at http://www.imf.org/external/ns/cs.aspx?id=28.  
TABLE 2:  Summary of MCC Indicators 
 
  
Indicator Unit Source
Political Rights (-) Point Scale (1-7) Freedom House
Civil Liberties (-) Point Scale (1-7) Freedom House
Voice and Accountability (+) Index (-2.5 - 2.5) World Bank Institute
Government Effectiveness (+) Index (-2.5 - 2.5) World Bank Institute
Rule of Law (+) Index (-2.5 - 2.5) World Bank Institute
Control of Corruption (+) Index (-2.5 - 2.5) World Bank Institute
Girls’ Primary Education Completion Rate (+) Percentage World Bank Group and UNESCO
Public Primary Education Spending (%GDP) (+) Percentage National Governments
Public Expenditure on Health (% GDP) (+) Percentage National Governments
Immunization Rate for DPT3 and Measles (+) Percentage World Health Organization
Cost of Starting a Business (% GDP per capita) (-) Percentage World Bank Group
1-Year Consumer Price Inflation (-) Percentage Multiple
Fiscal Policy (+) Percentage National Governments and IMF
Trade Policy (+) Percentage Heritage Foundation
Regulatory Quality (+) Index (-2.5 - 2.5) World Bank Institute
Days to Start a Business (-) Days World Bank Group
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Notes: Signs in parentheses indicate the direction of change that is associated with an improvement. Indicators 
highlighted in grey were not included in this analysis due to lack of data.
Indicators 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
1 Control of Corruption 1
2 Government Effectiveness 0.95 1.00
3 Rule of Law 0.96 0.96 1.00
4 Voice & Accountability 0.81 0.85 0.83 1.00
5 Immunization Rate 0.46 0.48 0.48 0.41 1.00
6 Health Expenditure 0.73 0.71 0.71 0.70 0.38 1.00
7 Primary Education -0.09 -0.15 -0.11 -0.06 -0.12 0.04 1.00
8 Girls' Primary Education 0.50 0.57 0.51 0.52 0.67 0.40 -0.25 1.00
9 Regulatory Policy 0.90 0.94 0.91 0.85 0.48 0.69 -0.21 0.52 1.00
10 Days to Start a Business -0.37 -0.39 -0.40 -0.29 -0.27 -0.33 0.02 -0.09 -0.39 1.00
11 Trade Policy 0.58 0.59 0.54 0.53 0.36 0.50 -0.15 0.39 0.66 -0.31 1.00
12 Inflation -0.33 -0.33 -0.33 -0.26 -0.02 -0.20 0.05 -0.06 -0.37 0.16 -0.13 1.00
13 Fiscal Policy 0.12 0.04 0.07 -0.03 0.02 -0.01 -0.09 -0.03 0.03 0.03 0.16 -0.04 1.00
Table 3:  Indicator Correlation Test
Note:  Highly correlated indicators (above .8) are highlighted.  
Table 4:  Country Lists (2004 - 2009) 
 
1 Afghanistan 28 Dominican Republic 55 Lao PDR 82 Rwanda
2 Albania 29 Ecuador 56 Lesotho 83 Samoa
3 Algeria 30 Egypt 57 Liberia 84 Sao Tome and Principe
4 Angola 31 El Salvador 58 Macedonia 85 Senegal
5 Armenia 32 Equatorial Guinea 59 Madagascar 86 Sierra Leone
6 Azerbaijan 33 Eritrea 60 Malawi 87 Solomon Islands
7 Bangladesh 34 Ethiopia 61 Maldives 88 Somalia
8 Belarus 35 Fiji 62 Mali 89 Sri Lanka
9 Benin 36 Gambia 63 Marshall Islands 90 Suriname
10 Bhutan 37 Georgia 64 Mauritania 91 Swaziland
11 Bolivia 38 Ghana 65 Micronesia 92 Tajikistan
12 Bosnia and Herzegovina 39 Guatemala 66 Moldova 93 Tanzania
13 Brazil 40 Guinea 67 Mongolia 94 Thailand
14 Bulgaria 41 Guinea-Bissau 68 Montenegro 95 Timor-Leste
15 Burkina Faso 42 Guyana 69 Morocco 96 Togo
16 Burundi 43 Haiti 70 Mozambique 97 Tonga
17 Cambodia 44 Honduras 71 Namibia 98 Tunisia
18 Cameroon 45 India 72 Nepal 99 Turkmenistan
19 Cape Verde 46 Indonesia 73 Nicaragua 100 Tuvalu
20 Central African Republic 47 Iraq 74 Niger 101 Uganda
21 Chad 48 Jamaica 75 Nigeria 102 Ukraine
22 China 49 Jordan 76 Pakistan 103 Vanuatu
23 Colombia 50 Kazakhstan 77 Papua New Guinea 104 Vietnam
24 Comoros 51 Kenya 78 Paraguay 105 Yemen
25 Congo Democratric Repbulic 52 Kiribati 79 Peru 106 Zambia
26 Congo Republic 53 Kosovo 80 Philippines
27 Djibouti 54 Kyrgyz Republic 81 Romania
1 Armenia 17 Malawi 1 Armenia
2 Benin 18 Mali 2 Benin
3 Bolivia 19 Moldova 3 Burkina Faso
4 Burkina Faso 20 Mongolia 4 Cape Verde
5 Cape Verde 21 Morocco 5 El Salvador
6 Colombia 22 Mozambique 6 Georgia
7 El Salvador 23 Namibia 7 Ghana
8 Gambia 24 Nicaragua 8 Honduras
9 Georgia 25 Philippines 9 Lesotho
10 Ghana 26 Senegal 10 Madagascar
11 Guyana 27 Sri Lanka 11 Malawi
12 Honduras 28 Tanzania 12 Mali
13 Indonesia 29 Timor-Leste 13 Mongolia
14 Jordan 30 Ukraine 14 Morocco
15 Lesotho 31 Vanuatu 15 Mozambique
16 Madagascar 32 Zambia 16 Namibia
17 Nicaragua
18 Senegal
19 Vanuatu
Candidate Countries 
Eligible Countries Compact Recipients 
Table 5:  Effect of Eligibility on Low-Income Countries 
Indicator Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Control of Corruption 104 -0.46 0.26 -0.95 0.14 
Government Effectiveness 104 -0.47 0.30 -1.18 0.25 
Rule of Law 104 -0.47 0.30 -1.32 0.18 
Voice & Accountability 104 -0.08 0.28 -0.85 0.50 
Immunization Rate 104 85.24 9.44 65.00 99.00 
Health Expenditure 104 3.49 1.79 1.13 14.13 
Primary Education 40 2.33 1.29 0.61 6.09 
Girls' Primary Education 83 73.38 24.21 23.74 111.94 
Regulatory Policy 104 -0.34 0.34 -1.59 0.60 
Days to Start a Business 104 36.04 27.43 3.00 153.00 
Trade Policy 102 72.95 7.80 54.00 89.06 
Inflation 104 7.76 5.16 -3.11 26.81 
Fiscal Policy 103 4.73 37.62 -11.22 306.77 
            
Indicator DD Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-Score Significance 
Control of Corruption 0.06 0.03 1.84 * 
Government Effectiveness 0.00 0.03 0.05   
Rule of Law -0.01 0.03 -0.25   
Voice & Accountability 0.02 0.03 0.50   
Immunization Rate -0.99 0.98 -1.02   
Health Expenditure 0.24 0.10 2.37 ** 
Primary Education -0.10 0.21 -0.48   
Girls' Primary education -0.21 1.17 -0.18   
Regulatory Policy -0.01 0.03 -0.43   
Days to Start a Business -2.90 3.49 -0.83   
Trade Policy 0.84 1.33 0.63   
Inflation 4.28 4.12 1.04   
Fiscal Policy 4.55 2.63 1.73 * 
Notes:  Statistically significant changes are highlighted.  * (**, ***) Significance at ten, 
five and one percent.  All regression include year and country fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 6:  Effect of Eligibility on Low-Middle-Income Countries 
Indicator Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Control of Corruption 25 0.12 0.40 -0.56 0.77 
Government Effectiveness 25 -0.07 0.26 -0.66 0.42 
Rule of Law 25 0.12 0.47 -0.78 0.63 
Voice & Accountability 25 0.06 0.63 -0.85 0.89 
Immunization Rate 25 87.48 15.61 60.00 99.00 
Health Expenditure 25 3.27 1.15 1.41 5.40 
Primary Education 16 2.28 0.67 1.38 3.32 
Girls' Primary Education 20 89.24 10.01 76.73 116.76 
Regulatory Policy 25 -0.08 0.32 -0.73 0.39 
Days to Start a Business 24 28.04 15.12 12.00 52.00 
Trade Policy 21 62.49 17.46 23.00 83.84 
Inflation 25 3.32 3.17 -1.89 13.94 
Fiscal Policy 25 -2.18 2.19 -5.56 1.02 
            
Indicator DD Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-Score Significance 
Control of Corruption 0.20 0.06 3.12 *** 
Government Effectiveness 0.09 0.05 1.70 * 
Rule of Law 0.04 0.06 0.60   
Voice & Accountability -0.07 0.06 -1.14   
Immunization Rate 0.37 1.62 0.23   
Health Expenditure -0.12 0.19 -0.64   
Primary Education -0.27 0.15 -1.80 * 
Girls' Primary education 0.23 2.17 0.11   
Regulatory Policy 0.10 0.06 1.71 * 
Days to Start a Business -15.52 5.30 -2.93 *** 
Trade Policy -1.16 3.05 -0.38   
Inflation 6.29 3.87 1.63 
 Fiscal Policy 0.35 0.71 0.49   
Notes:  Statistically significant changes are highlighted.  * (**, ***) Significance at ten, five 
and one percent.  All regression include year and country fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 7: Effect of Aid on Low-Income Countries 
Indicator Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Control of Corruption 44 -0.43 0.29 -0.89 0.14 
Government Effectiveness 44 -0.46 0.34 -1.04 0.25 
Rule of Law 44 -0.46 0.25 -0.97 0.04 
Voice & Accountability 44 -0.12 0.32 -0.82 0.50 
Immunization Rate 44 85.35 9.47 70.00 98.50 
Health Expenditure 44 3.26 1.12 1.50 5.90 
Primary Education 18 2.24 0.94 1.05 4.47 
Girls' Primary Education 31 68.25 21.98 28.31 104.44 
Regulatory Policy 44 -0.22 0.31 -0.65 0.60 
Days to Start a Business 44 23.09 12.11 3.00 44.00 
Trade Policy 44 73.84 8.16 57.00 89.06 
Inflation 44 8.26 5.55 -0.25 26.81 
Fiscal Policy 44 -0.13 4.98 -11.22 11.00 
            
Indicator DD Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-Score Significance 
Control of Corruption 0.03 0.04 0.67   
Government Effectiveness 0.05 0.04 1.19   
Rule of Law 0.02 0.04 0.57   
Voice & Accountability -0.02 0.04 -0.56   
Immunization Rate -0.14 1.27 -0.11   
Health Expenditure -0.06 0.13 -0.48   
Primary Education -0.36 0.21 -1.73 * 
Girls' Primary education 2.11 1.54 1.37   
Regulatory Policy 0.11 0.04 2.46 *** 
Days to Start a Business -7.15 3.95 -1.81 * 
Trade Policy 0.10 1.69 0.06   
Inflation 3.19 5.33 0.60   
Fiscal Policy -3.99 3.43 -1.16   
Notes:  Statistically significant changes are highlighted.  * (**, ***) Significance at ten, 
five and one percent.  All regression include year and country fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 8: Effect of Aid on Low-Middle-Income Countries 
Indicator Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Control of Corruption 13 0.22 0.43 -0.36 0.77 
Government Effectiveness 13 -0.10 0.23 -0.43 0.42 
Rule of Law 13 0.12 0.55 -0.78 0.63 
Voice & Accountability 13 0.33 0.57 -0.79 0.89 
Immunization Rate 13 85.46 17.73 60.00 99.00 
Health Expenditure 13 3.02 0.64 1.87 3.85 
Primary Education 9 2.28 0.67 1.38 3.18 
Girls' Primary Education 10 87.88 7.06 77.02 96.42 
Regulatory Policy 13 -0.14 0.34 -0.73 0.38 
Days to Start a Business 13 32.31 15.12 12.00 52.00 
Trade Policy 11 64.80 14.33 41.20 83.84 
Inflation 13 3.81 2.14 0.43 7.26 
Fiscal Policy 13 -1.44 2.22 -5.23 1.02 
            
Indicator DD Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-Score Significance 
Control of Corruption 0.34 0.07 4.77 *** 
Government Effectiveness 0.11 0.06 1.84 * 
Rule of Law 0.06 0.07 0.78   
Voice & Accountability 0.04 0.07 0.66   
Immunization Rate 0.39 1.95 0.20   
Health Expenditure -0.16 0.22 -0.72   
Primary Education -0.45 0.17 -2.67 *** 
Girls' Primary education -2.90 2.68 -1.09   
Regulatory Policy 0.11 0.07 1.52 
 Days to Start Business -5.34 5.82 -0.92   
Trade Policy 2.86 3.87 0.74   
Inflation 5.40 4.66 1.16   
Fiscal Policy 1.33 0.83 1.60 
 Notes:  Statistically significant changes are highlighted.  * (**, ***) Significance at ten, 
five and one percent.  All regression include year and country fixed effects. 
 
  
Table 9: Effect of MCC Announcement on Low-Income Countries  
Indicator Observations Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Control of Corruption 518 -0.81 0.46 -2.02 0.84 
Government Effectiveness 518 -0.84 0.50 -2.50 0.47 
Rule of Law 518 -0.86 0.53 -2.69 0.43 
Voice & Accountability 518 -0.72 0.64 -2.29 0.68 
Immunization Rate 518 76.77 16.58 23.00 99.00 
Health Expenditure 511 2.64 1.69 0.61 14.13 
Primary Education 193 1.77 1.08 0.06 6.09 
Girls' Primary Education 337 67.49 26.14 16.51 119.20 
Regulatory Policy 518 -0.79 0.57 -2.73 0.60 
Days to Start a Business 484 53.73 43.82 3.00 259.00 
Trade Policy 447 63.65 14.89 0.00 89.06 
Inflation 496 9.03 8.27 -12.24 98.34 
Fiscal Policy 487 0.72 23.72 -24.65 328.32 
            
    
Indicator DD Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
T-Score Significance 
Control of Corruption -0.04 0.03 -1.3   
Government Effectiveness -0.01 0.03 -0.18   
Rule of Law -0.01 0.03 -0.37   
Voice & Accountability 0.05 0.03 1.73 * 
Immunization Rate 11.11 1.03 10.83 *** 
Health Expenditure 0.49 0.11 4.48 *** 
Primary Education 0.23 0.21 1.1   
Girls' Primary Education 18.38 1.54 11.96 *** 
Regulatory Policy -0.04 0.03 -1.27   
Days to Start a Business NA NA NA   
Trade Policy 4.56 1.50 3.04 *** 
Inflation -13.92 4.41 -3.15 *** 
Fiscal Policy -0.18 2.85 -0.06   
Notes:  Statistically significant changes are highlighted.  * (**, ***) Significance at ten, five 
and one percent.  All regression include year and country fixed effects. 
 
 
